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Bounded Rationality, Satisficing and the Evolution of Economic Thought 
Abstract 
Provides a sketch of the development of the concept of bounded rationality in economic 
thought. The concept of rationality has several meanings. These different meanings are taken 
into account in considering the further development of economic thought. Different views of 
ecological rationality are critically examined in the light of these concepts. Whether or not 
various theories of behavioral economics can be classified as exhibiting bounded rationality is 
discussed. Satisficing behavior is commonly associated with bounded rationality but as 
demonstrated, it is not the only reason for adopting such behavior. The idea of some authors 
that optimization models under constraints are of little or no relevance to bounded rationality 
is rejected. Bounded rationality is an important contributor to the diversity of (economic) 
behaviors. This is stressed. Whether or not a behavior is rational depends to a considerable 
extent on the situation (the constraints) that decision-makers or actors face. The time-constraint 
is very important as an influence on the rationality of decisions. Aspects of this are covered.  
Keywords: Behavioral economics, bounded rationality, cues, ecological rationality, 
discretionary behavior, precautionary principle, rules of thumb. 
JEL Codes: D21, D22, D81, D83, D91, G11, Q01 
1. Introduction 
Neoclassical economic models are based on the absence of any constraints on the exercise of 
rationality and most rely heavily on optimization goals in order to predict economic outcomes. 
This is particularly evident in traditional microeconomic theory. Most theories presume that 
both consumers and producers are omniscient and not hindered in any way in making decisions 
needed to achieve their optimization goals. As is well known, these assumptions are too 
stringent to reflect reality and have probably become more so as the economic world has 
evolved to become more complex. 
This does not mean that neoclassical economic theories have no value for understanding the 
operation of economic systems, especially market systems. Many do have predictive value, 
even if it is sometimes only of a qualitative nature. Furthermore, the assumption of unrestricted 
rationality is stronger than is required for perfect or near-perfect economic decision-making 
(Tisdell, 1975). Nevertheless, there are many economic situations in which the presence of 
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bounded rationality is a significant influence on economic behavior, and is consequential for 
the evaluation of this behavior and economic valuation.  
In this chapter, an initial sketch will first be provided of the influence of the concept of bounded 
rationality on the evolution of economic thought. It is then argued that it is imperative to clarify 
the meaning of the concepts of rationality and bounded rationality. Further attention is paid to 
the evolution of economic thought taking this into account. Attention subsequently turns to 
considering satisficing behavior as a reaction to bounded rationality. (Simon, 1957, 1961) 
placed considerable emphasis on this type of behavior due to the presence of bounded 
rationality. His emphasis on satisficing behavior contrasts strongly with the central assumption 
of unbounded optimizing behavior in neoclassical economic theories. Before concluding, an 
overall assessment of the place of bounded rationality in economics is provided. Note that the 
coverage of this chapter is very selective because only limited space has been allowed for it.  
2. An Initial Sketch of Bounded Rationality in Economic Thought 
Some questioning of the applicability of the neoclassical model of economic behavior had 
begun already in the 1930s. For example, in relation to macroeconomic theory, Keynes (1936) 
emphasized the importance of “animal spirits” as an influence on the behavior of investors and 
the effect of this on the level of economic activity. Hall and Hitch (1939) came to the conclusion 
that cost-plus pricing was prevalent in several sectors of the economy. This was attributed to 
two different possible causes: it could be a result of oligopolistic market behavior. 
Alternatively, it might be employed as a rule of thumb because many firms lack the capacity 
to determine the level of pricing which will maximize their profit. Hall and Hitch (1939) found 
the latter to be very important. This publication subsequently sparked debate about whether 
this cost-plus procedure might, in fact, maximize a firm’s profit and whether all firms are profit-
maximizers.  
Another important development in the evolution of economic thought about bounded 
rationality was the publication of the theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, 1944). It highlighted limits to the exercise of unrestricted individual 
rationality as a means for providing solutions to group behavior involving conflict. In addition, 
it helped to explain failures to achieve socially optimal group outcomes, such as Pareto 
optimality. For example, it indicated that under omniscient conditions for decision-making, 
economic behavior cannot be precisely determined, as in the case of zero-sum games where 
the solution relies on mixed strategies and in empty-core games involving the possibility of 
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transactionless coalition formation. This development prompted Simon (1955) to doubt the 
applicability of the unrestricted neoclassical rationality assumption as a determinant of 
economic behavior, and he developed further his concept of bounded rationality as being more 
relevant. It is, however, pertinent to note that Morgenstern was aware of limits to the 
applicability to economics of the neoclassical concept of unlimited rationality (Morgenstern, 
1964).  
As an alternative approach to economic behavior, Herbert Simon developed a satisficing theory 
of decision-making and economic behavior. The cost of obtaining information, of retaining it, 
and of reasoning, were seen as important restrictions on the ability of individuals to make 
absolutely optimal decisions of the type assumed in neoclassical economics. The assumption 
of satisficing behavior was subsequently applied to consumer behavior and to the theory of the 
firm, particularly to the latter.  
Another significant but embryonic development was the publication of an article by Baumol 
and Quandt (1964) outlining a theory of optimally imperfect decisions. This provided an insight 
into how much information gathering, the amount of its retention, and reasoning in decision-
making is likely to be economically optimal. They pointed out that taking into account the 
adoption of some rules of thumb (such as those employed by some firms in adopting cost-plus 
pricing) could be rational from an economic perspective.  
The type of modeling of Baumol and Quandt (1964) belongs to the class of modeling of 
bounded rationality sometimes described as optimization under constraint, that is, optimization 
which takes into account the cost of decision-making. An earlier example of this was the 
stopping rule of Stigler (1961) for searching for the purchase of a used car, namely, stop 
searching when the extra cost of searching equals the extra expected benefits. Similar sorts of 
stopping rules have been adopted for quality control serial sampling by producers and are of 
relevance to other types of sampling. However, Gigerenzer and Selten (2002, pp. 4-5) question 
whether this type of optimization modeling which incorporates decision-making costs captures 
the essence of the occurrence of bounded rationality. This issue will be considered in the 
discussion section.  
(Tisdell, 1963, 1968, 1996)  emphasized that as a result of bounded rationality (and other 
factors) economic behaviors can be expected to be diverse and that this diversity had been 
neglected in neoclassical theory. Nevertheless, diverse behaviors have predictable economic 
consequences. Empirical investigations are needed to determine the extent of that diversity and 
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its other attributes such as its variation with the passage of time. Studies in behavioral 
economics, experimental economics, and psychological economics are all relevant to exploring 
this aspect of economics. 
Another area of economic thought which has advanced as a result of giving attention to the 
occurrence of bounded rationality is whether it is more desirable to follow rules rather than 
discretion in decision-making, that is, engaging in flexible or less flexible types of decision-
making. The more flexible type, for example, may involve adjusting controlled variables based 
on short-term predictions of uncontrolled variables in an attempt to achieve a particular 
objective. The size and nature of the divergence between the predicted and actual values of 
controlled variables may be such that greater benefit can be obtained by ignoring short-term 
predictions and acting on long-term predictions such as predicted central values of the 
uncontrolled variables (or approximations to these).  
Friedman (1968) pointed out that following rules rather than engaging in discretionary zig-zag 
or fine-tuning behavior could result in a more desirable type of monetary policy. Tisdell (1971, 
1974), in criticizing Muth’s theory of rational expectations (Muth, 1961), came to a similar 
conclusion and pointed out that this also applied to other areas of economics as well.  
Rapid development of other areas of economics associated with the concept of bounded 
rationality occurred in the 1970s. Considerable attention was paid to how the transaction costs 
involved in economic organization resulted in participants in economic activity having 
incomplete knowledge (see, for example, Williamson, 1975). Issues such as the following were 
highlighted: principal-agent problems, the incompleteness of contracts and the importance of 
trust in exchange (Williamson, 1975, 1979) and the possibility of market collapse or inferior 
operations of markets due to the asymmetry of information of market participants (Akerlof, 
1970).  
Neoclassical economic theories of behavior were mostly based on introspection but also 
obtained considerable empirical support from observations on the operations of markets. This 
was partly because the assumption of unrestricted rationality is stronger than necessary for 
qualitative predictions about how many markets work (Tisdell, 1975). Nevertheless, it became 
increasingly clear that not all economic phenomena could be understood or predicted by relying 
on the assumption of unrestricted rationality. This led to an upsurge in the development of 
behavioral economics and psychological economics and increasing attention to experimental 
economics. However, questions have been raised about whether many of the advances made in 
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these fields of inquiry are consistent with the theory of bounded rationality. For example, 
Gigerenzer and Selten (2002, p. 4) claim they are not, and also argue that optimizing theories 
based on decision-making under constraints do not reflect the essence of bounded rationality. 
In order to help clarify this problem, it is helpful to consider the meanings of the word 
“rational”. This will provide scope for some discussion of additional theories of economic 
behavior which have been associated with bounded rationality as well as consideration of the 
concept of ecological rationality.  
3. Meanings of Rationality and the Further Development of Economic Thought Including 
the Concept of Ecological Rationality 
The word “rational” has several different meanings in English (Delbridge, 1981).  
Two relevant different meanings are: 
1. A decision or behavior is rational if it involves reasoning (Type 1 rationality). 
2. A decision or behavior can be judged to be rational if it is reasonable or sensible (Type 
2 rationality).  
Given the first interpretation, a behavior that does not involve reasoning is not a rational form 
of behavior. Nevertheless, it could be effective for particular purposes, such as instinctive 
behavior is in particular circumstances. The second meaning involves judgment by an observer 
about whether a behaviour is reasonable. Whether or not it is judged to be reasonable or 
sensible can depend upon the circumstances surrounding the behavior. Given the second 
meaning, behavior that does not involve forethought or reasoning can be rational. Moreover, 
given this meaning, “excessive” forethought or reasoning in decision-making is not reasonable 
and therefore it is irrational, as is faulty reasoning.  
Not all decisions and behaviors which are effective in achieving a desired outcome are based 
on reasoning. For example, some instinctive and emotional behaviors are effective in particular 
circumstances for achieving desired ends. They are not a result of type 1 rationality, but may 
satisfy type 2 rationality.  
Given the two meanings of “rationality” outlined above, it is clear that the extent to which 
rationality is present in decision-making and behavior can vary in degrees. Moreover, the 
presence of rationality in the second sense outlined above is subject to personal judgment. 
Much of the focus of the study of ecological rationality is on non-optimizing behaviors which 
are sensible (given bounded rationality) and behaviors that are effective for some particular 
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purpose but which have been developed or occur without recourse to reasoning. Gerd 
Gigerenzer is a prominent advocate of this approach.  
Gigerenzer and Selten (2002, p. 38) describe ecological rationality as “the match between 
heuristics and environmental structures” and indicates that this requires paying particular 
attention to satisficing behaviours as part of search and decision-making and the adoption of 
fast and frugal heuristics, for example, involving the use of cues in making decisions. However, 
this ecological approach is even wider than this because it judges some behaviors to be rational 
which do not involve heuristics or rules of thumb. These include some forms of intuitive and 
emotional behavior as well as various social norms. These behaviors are considered to be 
rational if they serve a particular end or purpose. Also, the Gigerenzer group of ecological 
rationalists is aware that the amount of thought it is rational to give to a decision depends on 
the time-constraint faced by decision-makers. However, this group rejects the relevance of 
economic models of optimization based on constrained decision-making and even more 
strongly rejects the neoclassical model of unbounded rationality (Selten, 2002). They also cast 
doubts on the relevance to bounded rationality of behavioral psychological studies, such as 
those associated with Kahneman (2003) (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002, p. 4). 
An overlapping but narrower view of ecological rationality is adopted by Vernon Smith (2003). 
He describes ecological rationality as “an emergent order based on trial-and-error cultural and 
biological evolutionary processes” (Smith, 2003, pp. 499-500). His primary concern is with 
group rationality in economics. He rejects the relevance of constructivist rationality, namely 
that social mechanisms are as a rule thoughtfully created to serve a perceived intended purpose 
(Smith, 2003, p. 470). In general, he believes that evolutionary processes and trial-and-error 
processes are effective in developing optimal social rules of behavior and social norms that are 
beneficial in promoting desirable social ends. However, his view is too sweeping. In the past, 
some societies developed social norms and religious beliefs which did not promote desirable 
social ends. Examples of this have been proposed by Diamond (2011). These include the 
deforestation of Easter Island (Rapa Nui in the Pacific Ocean) by its original inhabitants and 
the Mayan collapse. Several other societies have engaged in persistent irrational behaviors – 
some as a result of their religious beliefs or their adoption of forms of unsustainable economic 
development – which eventually proved to be catastrophic from their point of view, for 
example, early producers of copper and bronze in central Europe (Tisdell and Svizzero, 2018). 
Today there are concerns that we may not be able to establish effective norms and behaviors 
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to restrict global warming “adequately”. Theoretically, there is no guarantee that selective 
evolutionary processes will result in the prevalence of “optimal” decisions (Tisdell, 2013).  
Another approach to considering the consequences of bounded rationality in economics is 
based on the development of psychology for behavioral economics. This type of approach to 
bounded rationality was initially developed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 
Kahneman (2003, p. 1449) explains that this type of research about bounded rationality 
explores “the systematic biases that separate the beliefs that people have and the choices they 
make from optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent choice models”. These biases 
are mainly identified by relying on experiments but may also be discovered by considering 
observations from non-experimental situations (Camerer et al., 2003).  
One of the significant results from this line of enquiry which has extended the findings of 
Thaler (1980) has been to show the importance of loss aversion, endowment or status quo effect 
as an influence on several types of economic decision-making. Kahneman (2003, p. 1457) 
explains that this effect is present when “the value of a good to an individual appears to be 
higher when the good is viewed as something that could be lost or given up when the same 
good is evaluated as a potential gain”. Examples are given by Kahneman (1990), Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman et al. (1991). Bandara and Tisdell (2005) found evidence of 
the importance of this effect in relation to willingness to pay for the conservation of elephants 
in Sri Lanka. The status quo effect is not allowed for in traditional economic theory. There can 
be several reasons for the occurrence of this effect, for example, a psychological desire to keep 
valued items which one already has (possessiveness), transaction cost considerations, and the 
possibility that the consumption or enjoyment of the commodity alters the taste of the 
possessor. These aspects require further investigation. 
Another aspect of bounded rationality which has been given much attention by contributors to 
behavioral economics is the importance of frames in shaping decisions (Kahneman, 2003). The 
emphasis, in this case, is on how individuals perceive alternative possible states of nature, or 
more generally, possibilities. Both the selective nature of perceptions and their distortions are 
studied. These aspects of perception are relevant for predicting economic behaviors and also 
for assessing the worth and limitations of economic valuation studies, particularly those valuing 
alterations in the supply of public and quasi-public goods, especially environmental goods. 
Results from these investigations (and other types of studies) demonstrate that economic 
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valuation (reliant on the assumptions of neoclassical economics) of changes in the supply of 
public goods, particularly environmental goods, can be problematic.  
5. Satisficing and Bounded Rationality 
Simon (1957, 1961) stressed that one of the consequences of the presence of bounded 
rationality is that individuals and organizations often adopt satisficing behaviors or rules rather 
than optimizing. In principle, satisficing behaviors which occur because of bounded rationality 
can take several different forms. Some such behaviors may be based on aspiration levels or 
targets for performance. These are usually not optimal in the neoclassical sense. The degree to 
which these targets are adaptive is liable to vary. Other behaviors of a satisficing type may rely 
on rules of thumb or heuristics and limited cues about states of nature. If they give satisfactory 
benefits, their use may persist. However, this is not always so. Searches may continue for 
superior rules of thumb and cues, especially if the environments in which decisions are to be 
made alter, even though initially inferior rules and cues are utilized.  
Not all satisficing behavior is a result of bounded rationality, even though some forms are at 
odds with the underlying assumptions of neoclassical economic theory. Bendor (2015, p. 774) 
states, for example: 
“Bounded rationality should not be confused with a theory (e. g., of satisficing), much 
less with a specific formal model (e. g., Simon 1957). It is best considered a research 
program: a sequence of theories with overlapping sets of assumptions, aimed at 
solving similar problems…. In principle, the program’s empirical domain is vast—it is 
as imperialistic as the rational choice program—and so its set of possible theories is 
also very large.” 
For example, Baumol’s theory of behavior of an imperfectly competitive corporation assumes 
that the company tries to maximize the value of its sales subject to ensuring its shareholders 
receive a satisfactory level of profit return (Baumol, 1959). In this instance, bounded rationality 
is not involved. Sahlins’ theory of the affluence of some ancient societies supposes that 
members of these societies were completely satisfied with a low level of consumption of 
material goods (Sahlins, 1972) and does not rely, per se, on any assumptions about bounded 
rationality. Some theories also exist which suppose that the utility obtained by individuals is a 
function of the difference between the level of the income to which they aspire (or some other 
economic variables) and the levels achieved. This is, for example, a component of Weckstein’s 
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model (Weckstein, 1962). No element of bounded rationality is involved. These types of 
models are of particular interest because they raise questions about how aspiration levels are 
determined and adjusted. Another relevant aspect of satisficing goals is the extent to which 
failure to achieve these goals is foreshadowed and results in decisions to address this emerging 
failure or action is delayed until the satisfaction goal is violated. Is the former behavior more 
rational than the latter? To what extent is the latter a result of bounded rationality? These two 
types of behaviors are, for example, highlighted by Tisdell and Svizzero (2017) in their 
discussion of the transition of ancient societies from hunting and gathering to agriculture.  
6. Discussion 
Gigerenzer and Selten (2002) suggest that two sets of models that are often discussed under 
the banner of bounded rationality have not been appropriately classified. They state: 
“Bounded rationality is neither optimization nor irrationality. Nevertheless, a class of 
models known as optimization under constraints is referred to in the literature as 
‘bounded rationality’, and the class of empirical demonstrations of ‘so-called’ errors 
and fallacies in judgment and decision-making has been labeled ‘bounded rationality’. 
The fact that these two classes have little if anything in common reveal the distortion 
that the concept of bounded rationality has suffered.” (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002, p. 
4) 
However, it can be argued that the first set of models are relevant to the study of bounded 
rationality. They highlight limits to the neoclassical vision of unrestricted rationality. While 
their knowledge and rationality assumptions are still too strong, they can help to identify factors 
that ought to influence behaviors under conditions of restricted rationality. As for the second 
class of models (which include behavioral ones), most (but not all) identify limits to perceptions 
of states of nature and common faults in reasoning, both of which can be considered to be a 
consequence of bounded rationality. These classes of models (mostly behavioral economic 
ones) do demonstrate some of the limits to unrestricted rationality.  
One of the important consequences of bounded rationality is that it gives rise to variations or 
differences in the behaviors of individuals and groups. Individuals differ in the perception of 
states of nature, in the estimates of probabilities and risk, and in their willingness to take risks. 
This aspect has been stressed by Tisdell (1963, 1968) and in some of his later publications. 
These variations have predictable economic consequences but they have not been given enough 
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attention in the economic literature. Bendor (2015, p. 774) mentions that behavioral (economic) 
theories do not pay enough attention to differences in human behavior. Both regularities, 
differences and changes in behaviors all have important economic consequences.  
The time available for decision-making limits the scope for the gathering of information and 
reasoning, as stressed by Selten (2002). Sometimes, there is a definite end-point by which a 
decision must be made and action taken. In extreme cases, there may be little or no time 
available for rational decision-making involving data collection and thought. In these cases, 
action may be dictated by instinct or learned reactions. In other cases, a final decision may be 
delayed, resulting in both benefits and costs. Some of the factors that influence the optimality 
of delayed decisions have been examined by Tisdell (1970, 1996, Ch. 5). Where decisions may 
have to be made at short notice, a rational way to allow for these can be prepared in advance 
of their possible occurrence. However, the amount of rational preparation can be expected to 
vary.  
The value of the strategy of delaying decisions to gain extra information depends on the 
environmental scope for responding to this information, as does the ability of decision-makers 
to take advantage of changes in economic information  (Tisdell, 1996, Ch. 5, Tisdell, 1970). 
Therefore, apart from collecting more information, a rational response to bounded rationality 
can be to alter the environment in which decisions can have effect, for example, it may be 
possible to change existing environments to allow greater flexibility for responding to 
decisions. Examples of this include the adoption of production processes (techniques) that 
exhibit greater adaptability than otherwise in the production of different commodities (Tisdell, 
1963, 1968) and an increasing liquidity of assets to take advantage of varying investment 
opportunities which are subject to uncertainty. However, changing economic environments in 
this way usually comes at a cost. Therefore, analysis and judgment are necessary to decide 
whether acting in this way is worthwhile.  
A related concept in environmental economics is the precautionary principle (Tisdell, 2010, 
2015). If unrestricted rationality occurred, this principle would be irrelevant. Because the 
environmental future is uncertain, it becomes relevant. One of the manifestations of the 
principle is that in view of uncertainty, it is often desirable to keep options open, for example, 
conserve biodiversity. This permits advantage to be taken of new information which may 
become available in the future. Once again, environmental variation is made to provide greater 
11 
 
flexibility in available decision-making strategies. This may come at a cost, and how sensible 
it is depends on attitudes to the bearing of risk or uncertainty and the anticipated net benefits.  
Gigerenzer and others have emphasized the importance of fast and frugal heuristics (rules of 
thumb) and the use of selective cues as a guide to behavior. Presumably, the usefulness of these 
as reasonable guides to behavior depends on the economic situation that is being responded to. 
For example, greater use of these types of heuristics may be made in trading in financial 
markets (for example, trading on the stock exchange) than in trading in fixed assets. Identifying 
the types of cues that traders use for exchange in these markets (and other markets) is also 
important. This opens up a large area for empirical economic research. This is particularly so 
because different individuals and groups may employ different rules of thumb and cues. Mixed 
behaviors can be important for the operation of markets as well as alterations in the diversity 
of these behaviors (Lasselle et al., 2005, Tisdell, 2013). 
 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
Neoclassical economic theory pays no attention to the costs and other restrictions on rational 
decision-making and has therefore developed optimizing models of economic behavior which 
assume unrestricted rationality. These models are, in fact, special cases. Nevertheless, they do 
have some predictive value because their assumptions are stronger than is necessary for 
forecasting or explaining some types of economic behavior and for providing a guide to how 
some markets work. On the other hand, it is a mistake to assume that all economic behavior 
reasonably accords with that assumed in neoclassical economic theory. The realization of this 
has resulted in substantial progress in economic thought in recent decades and has created a 
new academic environment in which further progress is being facilitated, for example, as a 
result of joint contributions by psychologists, economists and others. In this short chapter, it 
has not been possible to consider all the advances in economic thought which have stemmed 
from research on bounded rationality. Much of this research is based on examining particular 
situations. We are now challenged to determine whether general principles can be distilled from 
these studies. It is also important that greater attention be paid analytically to how reasonable 
or sensible decisions made and behaviors observed under conditions of bounded rationality are, 
that is to go beyond the empirical determination of the impact of bounded rationality on 
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behaviors and decision-making. For example, to what extent can the rules of thumb used for 
economic decision-making be improved or replaced by ones that give superior results? To what 
extent are decision-makers cognisant of the factors which ought to guide their decisions when 
they are acting under bounded rationality and is there scope for them to improve their decisions 
by paying greater attention to such factors?  
The presence of bounded rationality has also created complications for methods derived from 
neoclassical economics of valuing public goods and experiential goods, especially 
environmental commodities. Results from the application of these methods (both revealed and 
elicited preference methods) need to be treated with caution given the presence of bounded 
rationality and the occurrence of biases in observed behaviors and in responses to elicitation of 
values. The challenge now is to determine what use can sensibly be made of these results for 
the purpose of social economic valuation.  
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